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Abstract
We specify a structural life-cycle model of consumption, labour supply and job mobility in
an economy with search frictions that allows us to distinguish between diﬀerent sources of risk
and to estimate their eﬀects. The sources of risk are shocks to productivity, job destruction,
t h ep r o c e s so fj o ba r r i v a lw h e ne m p l o y e da n du n e m p l o y e da n dm a t c hl e v e lh e t e r o g e n e i t y .O u r
model allows for four main social insurance programmes. In contrast to simpler models that
attribute all income ﬂuctuations to shocks, our framework allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of
the shocks from the responses to these shocks. Estimates of productivity risk, once we control for
employment risk and for individual labour supply choices, are substantially lower than estimates
that attribute all wage variation to productivity risk. Increases in productivity risk impose a
considerable welfare loss on individuals and induce substantial precautionary saving. Increases
in employment risk have large eﬀects on output and, primarily through this channel, aﬀect
welfare. The welfare value of government programs such as food stamps which partially insure
productivity risk is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial)
insurance against employment risk and no insurance against persistent shocks.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is an extensive literature analyzing individuals’ precautionary response to income risk
under incomplete markets. The theoretical literature has clariﬁed the circumstances under which
precautionary behavior arises. Empirical analysis has concentrated on assessing the levels of income
risk and the persistence of shocks;1 on showing that insurance markets are indeed incomplete;2
and on measuring the eﬀects of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk on life-cycle consumption proﬁles
a n dw e a l t ha c c u m u l a t i o n . 3 In most studies idiosyncratic risk is identiﬁed as the variance of an
appropriately deﬁned residual in a panel data model of income but the underlying sources of risk
are not distinguished and exogenous shocks are not disentangled from the eﬀects of actions (such as
changes in labour supply and job mobility) taken in response to such shocks. While we have learned
al o tb yt h i sﬁrst generation of models, to obtain a better understanding of individual responses to
risk and to carry out policy analysis, it is necessary to go deeper and to understand the sources of
risk and to recognize that many of the observed ﬂuctuations are the result of endogenous choices.
In order to disentangle shocks from the responses to the shocks, we specify a structural life-cycle
model of consumption, labour supply and job mobility. We then specify the underlying sources
of shocks that are the key drivers of observed ﬂuctuations in earnings. These include shocks to
individual productivity that persist across diﬀerent jobs and across time; ﬁrm level shocks that
lead to job destruction; the stochastic process of job oﬀers when employed and unemployed; and
v a r i a t i o ni nt h eq u a l i t yo ft h em a t c ho ﬀered. Our model captures how these basic underlying shocks
transmit into observed behavior, welfare and earnings ﬂuctuations. Without the labour supply and
job mobility choices, we would obtain a misleading picture on the extent to which individuals can
self-insure and the extent to which observed earnings ﬂuctuations reﬂect risk.4
Within our framework, we can distinguish between employment risk and productivity risk. Pro-
ductivity risk is individual-speciﬁc uncertainty which exists independently of the employer’s char-
acteristics. Employment risk captures the uncertainty about having a job and also about the ﬁrm
type. This includes the possibility of ﬁrm closure or job destruction, the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a new
1For example, see MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Guvenen (2007).
2See Cochrane (1991) and Attanasio and Davies (1996).
3See amongst others Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992), Carroll and Samwick (1997), Banks, Blundell
and Brugiavini (2001), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999).
4Krussell et al. (2008) highlight the importance of modelling labour market frictions alongside labour supply
choices in understanding the aggregate implications of incomplete markets.
1job match while unemployed, and the extent of unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms. In a fully
competitive labor market with no worker-ﬁrm match heterogeneity and no search costs, the dis-
tinction between employment and productivity risk would be meaningless because unemployment
would arise only due to low productivity resulting in the individual’s market wage being below the
reservation wage. Unemployment itself would not be a source of risk.5
Shocks diﬀer in their available insurance opportunities. For example, layoﬀs are usually partially
insured by the unemployment insurance system, while individual productivity shocks, other than
major observable health shocks, are rarely insured in any formal way because of moral hazard and
limited enforcement and commitment reasons. It is precisely this lack of formal insurance that
prompts prudent individuals to engage in precautionary behavior. Furthermore, the individual’s
response to earnings risk will depend partly on the availability of outside insurance - private or
public. With few exceptions (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995), the literature on precautionary
savings has assumed that only self-insurance is available. In this paper, we propose a model in which
people can self-insure, but may also be eligible for government provided insurance mirroring three
popular programs in the US: Unemployment Insurance (UI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Food
Stamps. These systems provide partial insurance only.
The parameters of our model are obtained partly from estimating the characteristics of the wage
process with endogenous participation and mobility choices, and partly from calibrating our life
cycle model to ﬁt observed participation proﬁles and unemployment durations. We use longitudinal
wage and job mobility data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and
unemployment duration data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
T h ee m p i r i c a lr e s u l t sw er e p o r tr e l a t et ot h en a t u r eo ft h ei n c o m ep r o c e s sa n dt h eb a s i ci m -
plications of the model. First, we show that our preferred stochastic process for income (the sum
of a random walk, an i.i.d. component, and a ﬁrm-worker match ﬁxed eﬀect) provides a good ﬁt
of the key facts in the data. Second, we ﬁnd that if mobility is ignored the estimated variance of
the permanent innovation to wages doubles, leading to an impression of much greater risk in the
earnings process. This is because much of the wage ﬂuctuations are due to individuals moving to
5Some recent papers have analysed the joint precautionary saving-labour supply decision. Low (2005), Pijoan-
Mas (2006), and Domeij and Floden (2006) analyze the joint saving and labour supply decision, but in a context
without exogenous job destruction, search frictions or job mobility. French (2004) analyses labour supply and savings
behaviour, but focuses on older workers. Heathcote et al. (2007) consider a joint saving-labor supply decision, again
without frictions, and focusing on the degree of partial insurance.
2jobs with better match speciﬁce ﬀects; ignoring this biases measured uncertainty upwards.
Turning to counterfactual experiments, we assess the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of risk by varying
some key parameters one at a time (including the variance of productivity risk, and the job destruc-
tion rate) and reporting the change in labour supply, output and savings. We also compute the
willingness to pay to avoid the various changes in risks.
When productivity risk increases, individuals are worse-oﬀ because of the increased risk and also
because output declines. However, individuals are willing to pay substantially more than the output
loss to compensate for the increased risk. When job destruction increases, output also declines and
unemployment increases, as we would expect. The environment becomes riskier as highly valued
jobs can be lost at a faster rate, but the welfare eﬀects of this risk are mitigated by the utility value
of leisure (which in our model is a substitute for consumption). Overall, although welfare falls as job
destruction increases, the willingness to pay to return to the original lower rate of job destruction is
less than the loss in output.
Finally, we measure the value that people assign to an increase in the various government provided
insurance programs in our model, and compare this to the value of a revenue equivalent cut in
proportional taxes. The welfare value of programs such as food stamps, which partially insure
productivity risk, is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial)
insurance against employment risk and no insurance against persistent shocks. The relatively low
value of unemployment insurance is in line with the results of Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992).6
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the distinction
between employment and productivity risk. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the
estimation strategy and results for estimating the wage process. Section 5 presents the calibration
process for the remaining parameters. Section 6 discusses possible alternatives to our wage process.
Section 7 presents our calculations of the behavioral eﬀects and the welfare costs of uncertainty and
the welfare beneﬁt of government insurance programs. Section 8 concludes.
6Lentz (2003) also analyzes the value of unemployment insurance, allowing for the interaction between search
frictions and saving. Costain (1999) proposes an equilibrium search model with precautionary savings that attempts
to measure the welfare eﬀects of unemployment insurance. Rendon (2006) examines the relationship between wealth
accumulation and job search dynamics in a model where the motivation for accumulating wealth is to ﬁnance voluntary
quits in order to search for a better job. However, all these papers, along with Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), ignore
the risk to individuals’ own productivity which is independent of any particular match.
32M o d e l
2.1 Overview
We specify a model where individuals choose consumption and make work decisions so as to maximize
an intertemporal utility function, in an environment with search frictions. We view the key sources of
shocks underlying earnings ﬂuctuations as being shocks to individual productivity, ﬁrm level shocks
leading to job destruction, the process of job oﬀers when unemployed and when employed, and the
q u a l i t yo ft h em a t c ho ﬀered. Thus individuals face multiple sources of uncertainty: in each period
employed individuals may be laid oﬀ or may receive oﬀers of alternative employment; unemployed
workers may or may not be oﬀered a job; all individuals face uninsurable shocks to their productivity.
The economy oﬀers partial social insurance in the form of a number of programs. These are
Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance and Social Security (pensions). When
simulating the model, changes to these programs are funded by proportional taxation; thus indi-
viduals are linked through the government budget constraint. The model has numerous sources of
dynamics. These include asset accumulation, the fact that job oﬀer probabilities are state dependent
and that current actions aﬀect future eligibility to the various programs. We consider two types of
individuals separately: the lower educated individuals, which include all those with a high school
diploma or less, and the higher educated individuals with at least some college.
In this section we start by describing the stochastic process of wages. Then we describe the
process of job arrival and job destruction. With the sources of shocks speciﬁed we then describe
the individual optimization problem and the distinction between employment and productivity risk.
The empirical analysis follows in the next sections.
2.2 Structure of Wages and Shocks
We begin the model speciﬁcation by outlining the process for wages. We assume that wages wit in
the data are governed by the process:
lnwit = dt + x0
itψ + uit + eit + aij(t0) (1)
where wit i st h er e a lh o u r l yw a g e ,dt represents the log price of human capital at time t, xit a vector
of regressors including age, uit the permanent component of wages, and eit measurement error.7 All
7More generally eit represents a mix between a transitory shock and measurement error. In the usual decomposition
of shocks into transitory and permanent components, researchers work with annual earnings data where transitory
4parameters of the wage process are education speciﬁc.
The term aij(t0) denotes a ﬁrm-worker match speciﬁcc o m p o n e n tw h e r ej (t0) indexes the ﬁrm
that the worker joined in period t0 ≤ t.8 It is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance σ2
a. We model the match eﬀect as constant over the life of the worker-employer relationship,
and so if the worker does not change employer between t and t +1 , there is no wage growth due
to the match eﬀect. If the worker switches to a diﬀerent employer between t and t +1 ,h o w e v e r ,
there will be some wage growth which we can term a mobility premium. In this case we deﬁne the
random variable ξit+1 = aij(t+1) − aij(t0) as the wage growth due to inter-ﬁrm mobility between
t and t +1 .S i n c e o ﬀers can be rejected when received, only a censored distribution of ξit+1 is
observed. The match eﬀect aij(.) is complementary to individual productivity. It is constant over
time but it will be assumed uncertain across ﬁrms.9 Both the match eﬀect and the idiosyncratic
shock have education-speciﬁc distributions. The information structure is such that workers and
ﬁrms are completely informed about uit and aij(.) when they meet (jobs are “search goods”). The
importance of match eﬀects in explaining wages has been stressed by Topel and Ward (1992) and
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) show in an equilibrium setting
how ﬁrm and individual heterogeneity translate into a match eﬀect.
Finally, we assume that there are constant returns to scale in labor implying that the ﬁrm is
willing to hire anyone who can produce non-negative rents. However, we assume the ﬁrm does
not respond to outside oﬀers. If ﬁrms did respond, this would imply that the match speciﬁce ﬀect
would increase each period with some probability and would manifest itself as a return to job
tenure. However, returns to tenure are thought to be small, once one controls for endogeneity of
job mobility.10 This provides some evidence that outside oﬀers are not an important source of wage
shocks may well be important because of unemployment spells. In our framework, this source of transitory shocks is
modelled explicitly through the unemployment process, through the choice about whether or not to work and through
job mobility. For this reason, attributing the transitory shock entirely to measurement error seems appropriate.
Further, in the empirical section we ﬁnd that the variance of eit is low, and indeed lower than the variance of
measurement error obtained on annual earnings by validation studies on the SIPP data we use (see Abowd and
Stinson, 2005).
8We should formally have a j subscript on wages but since it does not add clarity we have dropped it. Note also
that in the absence of ﬁrm data one cannot distinguish between a pure ﬁrm eﬀect and a pure match eﬀect. In the
latter case, one can imagine αij(t0) as being the part of the matching rent that accrues to the worker. We take the
bargaining process that produces this sharing outcome as given.
9Ideally we would like to allow also for shocks to the match eﬀect. These will act as within ﬁrm aggregate shocks.
Restricting match eﬀects to be constant is forced upon us by the lack of matched ﬁrm and individual data. In
section 6, we consider the alternative assumption of modelling individual productivity as a ﬁxed eﬀect and the match
component as stochastic.
10Altonji and Williams (2005) assess this literature and conclude that their preferred estimate for the US is a return
to tenure of 1.1% a year.
5growth on the job. While dealing with the eﬀect of outside oﬀers may be interesting, we leave this
for future research.
We assume that the permanent component of wages follows a random walk process:
uit = uit−1 + ζit (2)
where ζit is a normally distributed random shock with mean zero and variance σ2
ζ.W ea s s u m et h i s
shock reﬂects uncertainty.11
Given a particular level of unobserved productivity, the worker will be willing to work for some
ﬁrms but not for others, depending on the value of the match. We assume that the measurement
error eit is normally distributed with variance σ2
e. As far as the policy implications of the model
are concerned, we are interested in estimating σ2
a and σ2
ζ. We describe later how these are identiﬁed
and estimated.
The speciﬁcation we presented, while consistent with much of the evidence and in line with a
number of papers,12 is not uncontroversial. Two alternatives might be a model with a stationary
AR(1) process with a ﬁxed eﬀect in wage growth or a model where the match speciﬁce ﬀect is itself
stochastic. We discuss these alternatives in Section 6 and justify our choice.
2.3 Job destruction and job arrival rates
In each period workers receive an alternative job oﬀer with probability λ
e. Those who are currently
unemployed receive an oﬀer with probability λ
n. Individuals become unemployed either because
they choose to quit following particular wage realizations or because of exogenous job destruction,
which happens each period with probability δ. The friction parameters (as well as the variance
parameters discussed earlier) are all assumed to be speciﬁct oa ne d u c a t i o ng r o u p .
The composition of those becoming unemployed is not random in our model, despite the fact that
the job destruction rate acts as a random shock independently of individual skill levels. First, people
with bad productivity shocks will quit their jobs and the extent to which this happens depends on
the variance of the wage innovations. Second the job destruction rates can diﬀer by education group.
11An issue is how much of the year to year variability of wages reﬂects uncertainty. A large component of this
variability is measurement error, which we control for. Beyond that, primarily for lack of adequate data, we abstract
from the important issues that have to do with consumers having superior information vis-á-vis the econometrician
(For discussions and empirical analysis see Blundell and Preston (1998), Manski (2004) Pistaferri (2001, 2003) and
Cuhna, Heckman and Navarro (2004).
12See MaCurdy (1982), Topel (1991), Abowd and Card (1989), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (2001), and Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) .
6Thus there is selection into the unemployment pool both in terms of observable and unobservable
skill characteristics, and this selection means those becoming unemployed are less productive on
average than the employed.
We assume there is no exogenous depreciation of skills following job loss. Instead, the loss of the
particular match on entering unemployment may lead to wages on re-entry being lower because the
new ﬁrm will on average have a lower match value. This is the case because individuals in work will
have improved over the average oﬀer through job mobility, before a job in which they are employed
is destroyed.13 Thus ﬁrm heterogeneity implies that exogenous job destruction will lead to wage
losses and appear as scarring, which we document in the empirical analysis below.
We assume that job destruction and job oﬀer arrival rates are constant over time and so we ignore
business cycle eﬀects. We focus instead on the implications of idiosyncratic risk for behavior and
for welfare. By contrast, Lucas (1987) and others focus on the welfare beneﬁt of smoothing out the
aggregate business cycle risk, and Storesletten et al. (2001) focus on smoothing out the variation in
idiosyncratic risk. In our comparative static analysis, however, we show the eﬀects of diﬀerent values
of job destruction and job oﬀer arrival rates across a range consistent with the variation observed
over the business cycle.
2.4 Individual Optimization
We consider an individual with a period utility function
Ut = U(cit,P it)
where P is a discrete {0,1} labor supply participation variable and c is consumption. The individual








where β is the discount factor and Et the expectations operator conditional on information available
in period t (a period being a quarter of a year). Individuals live for L periods, may work from age
22 to 62, and face an exogenous mandatory spell of retirement of 10 years at the end of life. The
date of death is known with certainty.
13Indeed, as stated by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), “workers possessing skills that were especially suited
to their old positions are likely to be less productive, at least initially, in their subsequent jobs. Such a ﬁt between
workers’ skills and the requirements of their old jobs could have resulted from on-the-job investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital or from costly search resulting in particularly good match with their old ﬁrms”.
7The labour supply choice in our model is a discrete choice. However, since one period is one
quarter, this discrete choice can generate substantial variation in annual hours of work.14 The
worker’s problem is to decide whether to work or not and, if the opportunity arises, whether to
switch ﬁrm. When unemployed he has to decide whether to accept a job that may have been
oﬀered or wait longer. If eligible, the unemployed person will have the option to apply for disability
insurance. There is a ﬁxed and known probability of being successful, conditional on applying.
Whether employed or not, the individual has to decide how much to save and consume. Accumulated
savings can be used to ﬁnance spells out of work and early retirement.





We consider cases where γ>1 and η<0, implying that individuals are reasonably risk averse,
participation reduces utility and that consumption and participation are Frisch complements (i.e.
the marginal utility of consumption is higher when participating).
The intertemporal budget constraint during the working life has the form
Ait+1 = R
£











where A are beginning of period assets, R is the interest factor, w the hourly wage rate, h a ﬁxed
number of hours (corresponding to 500 hours per quarter), τw a proportional tax rate that is used
to ﬁnance social insurance programs, F the ﬁx e dc o s to fw o r k ,Bit unemployment beneﬁts, Tit the
monetary value of food stamps received, Dit the amount of disability insurance payments obtained,
and EUI
it , EDI
it ,a n dET
it are recipiency {0,1} indicators for unemployment insurance, disability
insurance, and the means-tested transfer program, respectively. Note also that there are costs of
applying for disability insurance which we discuss below.
We assume that individuals are unable to borrow either against the social insurance programs
14In the data, the variation in annual hours is predominantly due to changes in participation status during the year.
By using a quarter as he decision time we generate quite a lot of potential variation over the year. Hours elasticities
for workers are found to be very small in most empirical microeconomic studies for men; see MaCurdy et al. (1990),
Pencavel (2002) and Meghir and Phillips (2008) as examples.
8or against future earnings:
Ait ≥ 0
In practice, this constraint has bite because it precludes borrowing against unemployment insurance,
against disability insurance, against social security and against the means-tested program.
At retirement, people collect social security beneﬁts which are paid according to a formula
similar to the one we observe in reality (see below). These beneﬁts, along with assets that people
have voluntarily accumulated over their working years, are used to ﬁnance consumption during
retirement.
Unemployment Insurance We assume that unemployment beneﬁts are paid only for the
quarter immediately following job destruction. We deﬁne eligibility for unemployment insurance
EUI
it to mirror current legislation: beneﬁts are paid only to people who have worked in the previous
period, and only to those who had their job destroyed (job quitters are therefore ineligible for UI
payments, and we assume this can be perfectly monitored).15 We assume Bit = b×wit−1h, subject
to a cap, and we set the replacement ratio b =7 5 % . The replacement ratio is set at this high value
because the payment that is made is intended to be of a similar magnitude to the maximum available
to someone becoming unemployed. The cap is set according to the median state (Meyer, 2002).
In the US, unemployment beneﬁt provides insurance against job loss and insurance against not
ﬁnding a new job. However, under current legislation beneﬁts are only provided up to 26 weeks
(corresponding to two periods of our model) and so insurance against not ﬁnding a new job is
limited. Our assumption is that there is no insurance against the possibility of not receiving a job
oﬀer after job loss. This simplifying assumption means that, since the period of choice is one quarter,
unemployment beneﬁt is like a lump-sum payment to those who exogenously lose their job and so
does not distort the choice about whether or not to accept a new job oﬀer. The only distortion is
introduced by the tax on wages, used to ﬁnance UI.
15We have simpliﬁed considerably the actual eligibility rules observed in the US. A majority of states have eligibility
r u l e sw h i c ha r et o u g h e rt h a nt h er u l ew ei m p o s e ,b o t hi nt e r m s of the number of quarters necessary to be eligible for any
UI and in terms of the number of quarters of work necessary to be eligible for the maximum duration (Meyer, 2002).
However, making eligibility more stringent in our model is numerically diﬃcult because the history of employment
would become a state variable. Our assumption on eligibility shows UI in its most generous light.
9Universal Means-Tested Program In modelling the universal means-tested program, our
intention was to mirror partially the actual food stamps program but with three simplifying diﬀer-
ences. First, the means-testing is only on income rather than on income and assets;16 second, the
program provides a cash beneﬁt rather than a beneﬁt in kind;17 and third, we assume there is 100%
take-up. These assumptions mean that in our model there is no disincentive for poor individuals
to hold existing assets (as in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995); there is still however the disin-
centive to accumulate caused by the programs, as the public insurance will lead to a lower need for
precautionary savings.
For the purposes of the program gross income is deﬁned as
y
gross











(1 − Pit) (4)
giving net income of y =( 1− τw)ygross − d,w h e r ed is the standard deduction that people are
entitled to when computing net income for the purpose of determining food stamp allowances. The
value of the program is then given by
Tit =
½
T − 0.3 × yit
0
if yit ≤ y
otherwise (5)
where T is the maximum payment and where y should be interpreted as a poverty line. In the actual
food stamp program, only people with net earnings below the poverty line are eligible for beneﬁts
(which we denote by ET
it =1 ). The maximum value of the payment, T,i ss e ta s s u m i n gah o u s e h o l d
with two adults and two children, although in our model there is only one earner.
Disability Beneﬁts and Social Security Workers may ﬁnd themselves in circumstances
that would lead them to apply for disability insurance, the ﬁnal element of the budget constraint.
First, we allow only individuals who face a negative productivity shock to apply for disability. The
requirement of a negative shock to wages is meant to mimic a health shock, on the basis of which
an individual could claim to be eligible. Second, we require people to remain unemployed for at
least one quarter before being able to apply for disability insurance and then they must remain
16The diﬃculty with allowing for an asset test in our model is that there is only one sort of asset which individuals
use for retirement saving as well as for short-term smoothing. In reality, the asset test applies only to liquid wealth
and thus excludes pension wealth (as well as real estate wealth and other durables).
17We assume that the means-tested transfer is paid in cash rather than in the form of coupons (as with Food Stamps).
While this is in contrast with the reality, it would be of little practical importance if stamps were inframarginal or if
t h e r ew e r e“ t r a ﬃcking”. Moﬃtt (1989) ﬁnds evidence for both phenomena.
10unemployed in the quarter that the application is made. Again, this is meant to reﬂect the actual
rules of the system: there is a waiting period of 5 months between application and receipt of beneﬁts,
and during this period the individual must be unemployed. Third, we assume that only workers
above the age of 50 are eligible to apply for disability beneﬁts.18
Conditional on applying, individuals have a ﬁxed probability of obtaining the beneﬁt, which
we obtain from actual data (50%, see Bound et al., 2004). If successful, the individual remains
eligible for the rest of their working life and disability insurance becomes an absorbing state. If
not successful, the individual has to remain unemployed another quarter before taking up a job.
Individuals can only re-apply in a subsequent unemployment spell. The combination of disability
and the means-tested program turns out to be very important in ﬁtting the declining labor force
participation proﬁles with age. Disability payments can provide a high replacement rate which is
not aﬀected by the duration of unemployment. However, the requirement that individuals spend two
quarters unemployed before the disability application is resolved would discourage a large proportion
of applicants were it not for the means-tested (food stamps) program which provides a ﬂoor to income
during this application process.






0.9 × a1 +0 .32 × (wi − a1)
0.9 × a1 +0 .32 × (a2 − a1)+0 .15 × (wi − a2)
0.9 × a1 +0 .32 × (a2 − a1)+0 .15(a3 − a2)
if wi ≤ a1
if a1 < wi ≤ a2
if a2 < wi ≤ a3
if wi >a 3
(6)
where wi is average earnings computed before the time of the application and a1, a2,a n da3 are
thresholds we take from the legislation. We assume wi can be approximated by the value of the
permanent wage at the time of the application. Whether an individual is eligible (i.e., EDI
it =1 )
depends on the decision to apply (DIit =1 ) while being out of work and on having received a
large negative productivity shock. We assume that the probability of success is independent of age.
Eligibility does not depend on whether an individual quits or the job is destroyed.
By contrast with our assumption of a 50% probability of success for DI is our assumption of
100% take-up for our universal means-tested program and for unemployment insurance. We assume
that this diﬀerence arises because of the diﬃculty of verifying disability compared to the income test
18Interestingly, this was an actual requirement of the program at the time of inception (1956). In our model, it
reﬂects the fact that health shocks triggering disability are rare before this age.
11and the unemployment test.
In retirement, all individuals receive social security calculated using the same formula used for
disability insurance.
2.5 Employment Risk and Wage Risk
We allow for diﬀerent types of shocks that constitute risk an individual is facing and we distinguish
earnings and employment ﬂuctuations driven by endogenous decisions versus unexpected shocks.
The direct shocks to wages are interpreted as productivity risk. The job destruction process, the
rate at which job oﬀers are sampled in and out of work and the heterogeneity of ﬁrms constitute
employment risk.
The distinction between employment and wage risk becomes relevant in the presence of search
frictions and is further reinforced by the probability of job destruction. Firm heterogeneity adds
another dimension to this risk: it means that some jobs may be available with a match value
that would lead to a wage worth taking for an unemployed individual, even following a very bad
productivity shock. Search frictions however, make it hard to ﬁnd such a job and create uncertainty
in both the length of unemployment and in prospective earnings. Moreover ﬁrm heterogeneity
generates an option value to waiting in the unemployment state if the job arrival rate when on the
job is lower than the job arrival rate when unemployed. The model allows us to identify the eﬀects
of changes in each of these risks from the behavioral reactions to their presence/change.
The productivity shocks that we observe are assumed to be uninsurable uncertainty. These
productivity shocks may, for example, reﬂect health shocks or demographic shocks but we do not
specify their source in this model. We assume that there is no commitment from the side of the
ﬁrm (or the worker), so Harris-Holmstrom (1983) type contracts are not implementable. Further,
we assume there is no private insurance market against employment risk. This incomplete markets
set-up is consistent with results from Attanasio and Davis (1996) and others.19
19It is possible that observed wages may have already been smoothed out relative to productivity by implicit
agreements within the ﬁrm. This means that productivity risk may be greater than observed wage movements within
a ﬁrm, which implies that the process for productivity shocks is not properly identiﬁed for the unemployed. In other
words, productivity shocks are a combination of actual shocks plus insurance, but this insurance is only present if the
individual is working. If the unemployed experience greater productivity risk than estimated, this will impact on the
reservation wage and on job search. For the time being we ignore this issue as far as permanent shocks are concerned.
122.6 Value Function and Model Solution
The solution of the model consists of policy functions for consumption, participation, and realizations
of earnings, career paths, assets etc. There is no analytical expressions for these. Instead, the model
must be solved numerically, beginning with the terminal condition on assets, and iterating backwards,
solving at each age for the value functions conditional on work status. In this section, we discuss
the key features of the solution, more details on the method are provided in Appendix A.




, corresponding to current assets, indi-
vidual productivity and the match eﬀect. The match eﬀect is indexed by t0, which is the date the







corresponding to current assets, individual productivity and an indicator of whether the individual
is eligible to apply for disability in that period. When unemployed and receiving disability, the state
variables are {Ait,D it} where Dit is the amount of disability beneﬁt received deﬁned by equation
(6). Consumption is chosen to maximize each value function conditional on all other decisions.
Once consumption is substituted out of each value function the discrete labour supply and mobility
decisions can be made.
The value function for an employed individual incorporates the fact that in the next period he
will have the choice of quitting into unemployment, moving to a new job if he gets an alternative
oﬀer or staying with the ﬁrm. However if the job is destroyed the individual will have to move to
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20Ideally we should model the behaviour of the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm has a ﬁxed number of positions, and if there are
ﬁring costs, a ﬁrm with characteristic aij(.) may not make an oﬀer to any worker. High aij(.) ﬁrms may wish to wait
to locate high uit workers, in the same way that high uit workers may wish to wait for high aij(.) ﬁrms. At present
we ignore this issue.
13The expectation operator is conditional on information at time t.I ft h e r ei sn oo ﬀer available in
t+1, the expectation operator is over the productivity shock only; if an oﬀer is an oﬀer in t+1,t h e
expectation taken in t is also over the type of the ﬁrm making the oﬀer.
Among the unemployed, we distinguish between those who have the option of applying for
disability and those who are ineligible to apply (either because the individual is under 50 or because
he has not had a negative productivity shock or because he has had an application turned down in
the current unemployment spell).
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and S is the exogenous probability of a successful application. When deciding whether or not to
apply, the individual already knows if he has a job oﬀer in that period. If the disability application
is successful, we can calculate the resulting value function, V DI
t+1, analytically: the amount of the
disability insurance payment, Dit, depends on the permanent wage only and not on the particular
ﬁrm that the individual has most recently been working for. This amount is earned each year until
retirement.
Based on a comparison of the value functions, in each period the individual decides whether or
not to work; and if working, whether or not to move to another job if the opportunity arises; and if
not working, whether or not to apply for disability beneﬁt. The decision about whether or not to
move to another job if an outside oﬀer is received is, in practice, more straightforward than the other
decisions because we assume that there is no cost of switching ﬁrm. This means that the decision to
switch ﬁrm involves a simple comparison of the aij(.) and the individual will move if the new oﬀer
14Figure 1: Consumption as a function of current assets conditional on current period work status




















is from a higher aij(.)-ﬁrm than the current one.21
Because of the discrete nature of labour supply, consumption may not be continuous in assets and
value functions may not be necessarily diﬀerentiable, which complicates the optimization problem.
To give a clear example of this, we show the solution without retirement and so the life-cycle ends
at age 62. The same qualitative pictures are observed with retirement. Figure 1 shows consumption
as a function of assets in the period preceding the end of life, T − 1, for participants and non-
participants, and for diﬀerent ﬁrm types, conditioning on individual productivity. The sharp decline
in consumption when participating at a given ﬁrm in T − 1 arises at the asset stock which induces
the individual not to work in the next period, T. Because the individual is not working in period T,
lifetime income is lower and consumption falls in both periods. On the other hand, since leisure is
higher in the next period, overall welfare is higher: the value function is monotonically increasing in
assets. The extent of the fall depends on the degree to which consumption and leisure are substitutes.
If we look at the solution in earlier time periods or the solution with retirement included, these
sharp drops are smoothed out. This is partly because the fall in income associated with a change in
participation in one period in the future can be smoothed out over several periods. It is also partly
because uncertainty smooths the discreteness: a marginal increase in asset holdings in period t will
21If we were to allow for a cost of switching ﬁrm in the numerical solution, then the decision about whether or not
to switch would depend on a comparison of the value function at the existing ﬁrm and the value function at the new
ﬁrm. This diﬀerence will depend on the expected duration of the new job, the worker’s horizon and all elements of
the dynamic programing problem.
15only change participation in t +1in particular states and so has less of an impact on consumption
in period t than if participation in t +1changed in all states.
3D a t a
We use the 1993 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate our
wage dynamics parameters because it records all job to job transitions and the resulting new wage
each time. However, the SIPP follows individuals onl yf o r3y e a r sa n dt h i sm e a n st h a ti ti sl e s su s e f u l
for duration analysis. We use the 1988-1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to construct
participation and unemployment duration proﬁles. In both data sets, we stratify the sample by
education, low (those with a high school diploma or less), and high (those with some college or
more).
3.1 The SIPP
The main objective of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the
US Census Bureau, is to provide accurate and comprehensive information about the income and
welfare program participation of individuals and households in the United States. The SIPP oﬀers
detailed information on cash and non-cash income on a sub-annual basis. The survey also collects
data on taxes, assets, liabilities, and participation in government transfer programs.
The SIPP is a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older living
in households in the civilian non-institutionalized population. Those individuals, along with others
who subsequently come to live with them, are interviewed once every 4 months for a certain number
of times (from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 13 times). Each year, a new panel starts, so
some overlapping is expected. The ﬁrst sample, the 1984 Panel, began interviews in October 1983
and surveyed individuals 9 times. The second sample, the 1985 Panel, began in February 1985 and
surveyed individuals for 8 times. We use the 1993 panel, which has 9 interviews in total (or three
years of data for those completing all interviews).22
The Census Bureau randomly assigns people in each panel to four rotation groups. Each rotation
group is interviewed in a separate month. Four rotation groups thus constitutes one cycle, called
a wave, of interviewing for the entire panel. At each interview, respondents are asked to provide
22The raw data can be obtained at http://www.nber.org/data/sipp.html.
16information covering the 4 months since the previous interview. The 4-month span is the reference
period for the interview.
Our sample selection is as follows. The raw data has 62,721 records, one for each individual,
corresponding to 1,767,748 month/person observations (note that, due to attrition, not all individuals
complete 9 interviews). We drop females, those aged below 25 or above 60, those completing less than
9 interviews, the self-employed, those who are recalled by their previous employer after a separation,
those with missing information about the state of residence, and some outliers in earnings.23 Our
ﬁnal sample includes 6,226 individuals corresponding to 224,136 month-person observations, or 3
years of data per individual. We report some sample statistics in Table 8 in the appendix.
Our measure of (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) hourly wage is obtained by dividing annual earnings earned at the
ﬁrm by annual hours worked at the ﬁrm. Individuals may have multiple hourly wage observations
within a year if they work for multiple ﬁrms (concurrently or not). We use only the main job (the
one that pays the highest proportion of annual earnings). In the SIPP, each ﬁrm an individual is
working for is assigned an ID.24 We set Mit =1if the employer the individual is working for at time
t is diﬀerent than the one he was working for at time t − 1. We allocate individuals to the low and
high education groups based on response to a question about the highest grade of school attended.
An important advantage of the SIPP over the PSID when it comes to estimating the wage process
allowing for job mobility is that the SIPP does not average pay over diﬀerent employers. Thus the
full eﬀect of a move from one employer to another is observed.
3.2 The PSID
The PSID data are drawn from the 1988-1996 family and individual-merged ﬁles. The PSID started
in 1968 collecting information on a sample of roughly 5,000 households. Of these, about 3,000 were
representative of the US population as a whole (the core sample), and about 2,000 were low-income
families (the Census Bureau’s SEO sample). Thereafter, both the original families and their split-oﬀs
(children of the original family forming a family of their own) have been followed. In the empirical
analysis we use the core sample after 1988 because detailed data on monthly employment status and
other variables of interest are available only after that year.
23An outlier is deﬁned as one whose (annualized) earnings fall by more than 75% or grow by more than 250%.
24We use corrected ﬁrm IDs (see Stinton, 2003).
17Our sample selection is as follows. We focus on males with no missing records on race, education,
or state of residence. We drop those with topcoded wages, the self-employed, those with less than
three years of data, and those with missing records on the monthly employment status question.
Education level is computed using the PSID variable with the same name.
The PSID asked individuals to report their employment status in each month of the previous
calendar year and their year of retirement (if any). We use these questions to construct a quarterly
participation indicator for each individual and unemployment durations. We classify as not employed
in a given month those who report to be unemployed/temporarily laid oﬀ, out of the labor force, or
both, in that month. We treat unemployment and out-of-labor force as the same state; this tallies
with the deﬁnition of unemployment that we use in the simulations (see Flinn and Heckman, 1991,
for a discussion of the diﬀerence between these two reported states).25 In principle, the durations
are both left- and right-censored. Some spells begin before the time of the ﬁrst interview, while some
spells are still in progress at the time of the last interview. To avoid problems of left censoring we only
use spells that begin in the sample. In calculating durations, we take our sample to be individuals
who exit between 1988 and 1992. However, we use more recent years of PSID data (1993-1996) to
calculate durations for those whose spells are right-censored by the 1988-1992 window. This reduces
the censoring from 13.09% of all spells to 5.52%.
4 Estimating the Wage Process
Wages are observed conditional on individuals working; within-ﬁrm wage growth, which identiﬁes
the variance of permanent productivity shocks, is only observed if the individual does not change
job; between ﬁrm wage growth, which helps identify heterogeneity across ﬁrms is observed only for
job movers. Further, employment and mobility decisions are all endogenous and if this is ignored
we risk biasing the estimates of the variances to wages and of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
To address this problem our approach is as follows: First we model the selection process into and
out of work and between ﬁrms. We then construct sample selection terms and estimate wage growth
equations conditioning on these terms. We ﬁnally obtain the estimates of the variances of interest
by modelling the ﬁrst and second moments of unexplained wage growth for various subgroups. We
25If the distinction in the data between out-of-labor force and unemployment reﬂects a diﬀerence in search intensity,
we could make a meaningful distinction in our model only if we introduced a search decision with a cost attached.
18simplify the problem by assuming normality of all error terms.
Deﬁne the latent utility from labor market participation as P∗
it = z0
itϕ + πit. The associated
labor market participation index is Pit =1 {P∗
it > 0}, which is unity for participants. Workers
separate from their current employer voluntarily (quits) or involuntarily (layoﬀs). As argued by
Borjas and Rosen (1980), job turnover, regardless of who initiates it, represents the same underlying
phenomenon, that of workers’ marginal product being higher elsewhere. Let M∗
it = k0
itθ+µit denote
the latent utility from moving in year t to an employer that is diﬀerent from the one in t − 1.T h e
indicator Mit =1{M∗
it > 0} singles out the “movers”. We assume:
¡
πit πit−1 µit
¢0 ∼ N (0,I).
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of the wage equation (1), using the process for permanent shocks (2) and





∆lnwit = ∆dt + ∆x0
itψ + ζit + ∆eit + ξitMit
Wage growth is only observed for those who work in both years. To achieve identiﬁcation of the






a if j (s)=j (t) and zero otherwise.













(for all i, t) the variances of the permanent produc-
tivity shock and measurement error, respectively. We denote E (ζitπis)=σζρζπ if s = t and
assume it to be zero otherwise.26
3. Given the deﬁnition of the mobility premium ξit, we assume E (ξitπis)=σξρξπ if s = t,
E (ξitπis)=σξρξπ−1 if s = t − 1, and zero otherwise.
4. We allow for contemporaneous correlation between the unobservable of the job mobility de-
cisions (µ) and the shocks to the permanent productivity component and the match eﬀect:
E (ζitµis)=σζρζµ,a n dE (ξitµis)=σξρξµ for all s = t and zero otherwise.
5. We assume that the distribution of innovations to the match eﬀect ξit and the productivity
shock are uncorrelated (E(ξitζis)=0∀ t,s), and that there is no selection on measurement
error (E (eitπis)=E (eitµis)=0∀ t,s).
26We denote with ρab the correlation coeﬃcient between a and b,a n dw i t hσa the standard deviation of a.
19Suppose now that we select only those who work at t and t − 1 (Pit =1 ,P it−1 =1 ). It is easy
to show that:
E (∆lnwit|Pit =1 ,P it−1 =1 ) = E (∆lnwit|Pit =1 ,P it−1 =1 ,M it =1 )P r( Mit =1 )
+E (∆lnwit|Pit =1 ,P it−1 =1 ,M it =0 )( 1− Pr(Mit =1 ) )
= ∆dt + ∆x0
itψ + Git (9)
where Git is a “selection” term induced by labor market participation and inter-ﬁrm mobility (see
Appendix B for details).27 We estimate the components of this selection term in a ﬁrst stage
by running separate probit regressions,28 and use these to then estimate the parameters of (9)
consistently in a second stage using only participants.
We now need to estimate the variance of the permanent shocks the variance of the ﬁrm level
heterogeneity and the variance of the measurement error. Estimation is based on the moments of
unexplained wage growth (observed only for participants in both periods):
git = ∆(lnwit − dt − x0
itψ)=ζit + ∆eit + ξitMit (10)
We use the ﬁrst and second moments of 10 for movers (Mit =1 ) and for stayers (Mit =0 ),
as well as the ﬁrst-order autocovariance, always correcting for selection due to participation and
mobility. In addition to the two variances of interest we also estimate the relevant correlations that
drive selection. The estimation process takes also into account that the wage growth we model is
annual, while the participation decision is quarterly, in accordance with the model. The details of
the entire estimation process are given in Appendix B.
Standard errors are computed using the block-bootstrap procedure suggested by Horowitz (2002).
In this way we account for serial correlation of arbitrary form, heteroskedasticity, as well as for the
fact that we use a multi-step estimation procedure, pre-estimated residuals and selection terms.
We should point out that this procedure is likely to be conservative, since it allows for more serial
correlation than that implied by the moment conditions we use.
27In estimation we do not use the restrictions on the parameters of interest imposed by (9). This only results in a
loss of eﬃciency, but it does not aﬀect consistency. We estimate the standard errors by the block bootstrap.
28The assumed orthogonality assumption between πit and µit allows us to do this.
204.1 Results
4.1.1 Participation and mobility
We start by estimating quarterly participation probits using the SIPP data. These include a
quadratic in age, a dummy for whites, region dummies, a dummy for married, year dummies as
well as unearned household income, and an index of generosity of the welfare system, which here we
proxy with the generosity of the state-level UI system.29 The latter two are excluded from the wage
equation and are the instruments that identify selection into work - the unearned income as a pure
income eﬀect and UI as a ﬁxed cost of work while eligible.30 The participation equation for each
quarter is reported in the appendix in Table 9. The main point is that unearned income has a strong
and signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the probability of working. UI generosity is also a signiﬁcant
factor discouraging work, but only for the lower education group and not for the college graduates.
We also estimate a mobility probit, which will allow us to control for the censoring of the between
ﬁrm wage growth. The dependent variable is whether an individual who was working in period τ
is in a diﬀerent job in period τ +1 . Thus for the purposes of this estimation, mobility may include
those moving jobs via unemployment.31 The mobility probit includes the same variables as the
participation equation, as well as industry dummies and an indicator as to whether the person
was working for a non-proﬁt organization, in both cases for period τ. Unearned income inﬂuences
positively mobility for both education groups; UI generosity inﬂuences positively mobility for the
lower education group but not the college graduates. The eﬀect of UI on mobility is theoretically
ambiguous. On the one hand, it increases the reservation wage leading to individuals quitting
employment following negative wage shocks and increasing mobility through this mechanism. On
the other hand, when UI is low, durations of unemployment will be shorter and wage increases
will occur through job-to-job mobility. Our results indicate that the former eﬀect dominates. Our
29To obtain a measure of the generosity of the UI program in the state where the worker lives, we rank states
according to the ratio between maximum weekly UI beneﬁt (which we take from current legislation) and average
weekly wages (which we calculate from the CPS- using males only). Our measure of generosity is the rank variable,
which varies over time and across states. We obtain similar results if we rank states pooling data for all years. Ideally,
one would like to use an index of generosity of the Food Stamps program, but this is a federal program and its
time-series varaibility is negligible.
30In practice we exploit variation over states and time. For the exclusion restrictions to be valid the US labour
market should be suﬃciently integrated and suﬃcient trade should be taking place, so that variability in beneﬁts in
one state does not aﬀect the price of human capital in that state.
31We also tried to distinguish between “voluntary” movers (with no spell of unemployment in between two em-
ployment spells) and “involuntary” movers (those who move jobs via unemployment). We modiﬁed the selection
process outlines in the Appendix, but ﬁnd that the estimates of the variances of interest (σ2
ζ and σ2
a) change very
little (although the correlation coeﬃcients in Table 1 change considerably). Thus here we consider the simpler model
with a single mobility index.
21results also show that mobility declines with age for both groups. As people age, they tend to locate
in better ﬁrms, and thus it becomes increasingly unlikely that an outside oﬀer is suﬃciently good
to trigger mobility. Job destruction is an important force disrupting this age eﬀect. Table 10 in
Appendix C presents the results.32
4.1.2 Variance Estimates
Armed with these results, we move on to estimate the parameters of the wage process by the
method of moments, imposing constraints across equations. The moments we ﬁt, together with the
corrections for selection are reported in appendix B. The results are reported in Table 1. The σ
parameters refer to the standard deviations of the various stochastic components of wages. The
ρ parameters are the correlations between the various stochastic shocks and the shocks driving
selection. They are deﬁned in appendix B. We estimate the model for the whole sample to have a
comparison with previous work (column 1) and separately by the two education groups (columns 2
and 3).
When we control for selection into employment and for job mobility, we ﬁnd that in the whole
sample the standard deviation of the permanent shock, σζ, is about 0.10, the standard deviation of
the transitory shock (measurement error), σe, 0.09, and the standard deviation of the match speciﬁc
eﬀect, σa, 0.23. These parameters are all very precisely estimated. They imply that matching
heterogeneity is a very important component of wage dispersion; wages can ﬂuctuate ±46% between
ﬁrms for the same individual.
Columns (2) and (3) report the results of estimating the model separately for our two education
groups. The stochastic process of wages is very similar across the two education groups.
What happens if we ignore the fact that mobility is endogenous and attribute all wage ﬂuctuations
to the permanent and transitory shocks (σζ and σe)? This, implicitly, has been the assumption
made in papers estimating the covariance structure of earnings (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card,
1989; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004) and in the precautionary savings papers estimating risk via the
standard transitory/permanent shock decomposition (Carroll and Samwick, 2001; Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002). In column (4) we report the results of this experiment for the whole sample. The
estimated standard deviation of the permanent shock σζ increases by about 50%: a large proportion
32Unearned income and UI generosity as well as the industry dummies act as identifying instruments because they
are excluded from the wage growth equation.
22Table 1: Wage variance estimates
Whole Low High Neglect
sample education education mobility
(All)




















































































Note: σζ, σe,a n dσa are the standard deviations of the permanent shock, measurement
error, and the match component. ρζπ (ρξπ) is the correlation between the permanent
shock (mobility premium ξ = aj −aj−1) and unobserved heterogeneity in the participa-
tion equation. ρξπ−1 is the correlation between the mobility premium and unobserved
heterogeneity in the participation equation in the previous period. ρζµ (ρξµ) is the corre-
lation between the permanent shock (mobility premium) and unobserved heterogeneity
in the mobility equation. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are computed using the block
bootstrap. Bootstrap p-values in square brackets. We constrain all the correlation coef-
ﬁcients to lie between -1 and 1.
23of wage ﬂuctuations usually attributed to unexpected shocks is in fact a result of endogenous mobility
choices. This is likely to be important for the welfare costs of risk because individuals change jobs
quite frequently and because they do not have to accept worse paying jobs than the one they have.
However match dispersion does itself introduce risk: ﬁrst because individuals with good matches who
are displaced can expect to be hired at a lower rate (on average); and second, because individuals
face uncertainty about the quality of oﬀers they are likely to receive. On the other hand, match
dispersion also oﬀers the possibility of job improvements, which as we shall see, is a dominant factor
in the eﬀect of such dispersion on welfare when the arrival rate is suﬃciently high.
The estimated correlations that drive selection are reported on the lower panel of Table 1 and
conform to the expected signs. The most signiﬁcant is the neagtive correlation between the perma-
nent shock and mobility (ρζµ). For the purposes of correcting for selection in estimation, mobility is
deﬁned as any job change, including those taking place through unemployment. Since a good pro-
ductivity shock will encourage people to work, it will also result in less job changes than otherwise -
hence the negative and signiﬁcant correlation. The next most important one, with an overall p-value
of 13% is the correlation between a good alternative oﬀer and mobility, which is positive and quite
large, as expected.
5 Calibrated Parameters
We now need to set the remaining parameters required to complete the model. We set the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion γ equal to 1.5, taken from Attanasio and Weber (1995), whose model of
consumption also allows for nonseparable labor supply. The real interest rate is set equal to the real
return on 3 month treasury bills, at an annual rate r =0 .015, and this is set equal to the discount
rate ( 1
β − 1). The remaining parameters we obtain through calibration using the structural model
outlined in section 2.
Given the estimated parameters of the wage process and those set above, we now set the remaining
parameters to ﬁt the life-cycle participation proﬁle and unemployment duration proﬁle for men, by
education group. Our approach is to choose the parameters for each education group to minimize the
weighted sum of squares of the distance between statistics calculated in the data and corresponding
s i m u l a t e ds t a t i s t i c s .T h ew e i g h t sa r et h ei n v e r s eo ft h ev a r i a n c e so ft h es a m p l es t a t i s t i c s .
24Table 2: Parameters Obtained through Calibration
Parameter High Education Low Education
Job destruction rate δ 0.030 0.049
Job arrival rate - Unemployed λ
n 0.84 0.76
Job arrival rate - Employed λ
e 0.72 0.67
F i x e dc o s to fw o r kF 0.34 0.34
Disutility of participation η -0.59 -0.53
Note: The values of δ , λn and λe are given as quarterly rates. The value of the ﬁxed cost F for
each education group is expressed as a ratio to average earnings of that group at age 22.
The statistics we use are the average participation rate in four ten year age bands (22-31, 32-41,
42-51 and 52-6) and the mean duration of unemployment in eight ﬁve-year age bands. In Table 11 in
the appendix we show the ﬁto ft h em o m e n t sw eh a v et a r g e t e d .I nT a b l e2 ,w ep r e s e n tt h ec a l i b r a t e d
parameter values, with job destruction and arrival rates given at quarterly rates. In Figures 2 and
3 we show the calibrated proﬁles.
The job destruction rate is about 50% higher for the lower educated individuals than for the
higher educated ones. The contact rates are higher for the more educated and they are higher for
those out of work than when in work, possibly reﬂecting increased costs of search when working.
The value of η for high education individuals implies that work is equivalent to a 45% loss of
consumption. For those of low education the equivalent consumption loss is 41%.33 These values
also imply consumption and leisure are substitutes, and thus it is consistent with the observed fall of
consumption upon retirement (or unemployment). Finally, the ﬁxed costs of work for both education
groups correspond to about 34% of average earnings for a 22 year old in that group
Figure 2 shows participation proﬁles for the high educated and low educated. Each ﬁgure com-
pares the proﬁle in the data with the calibrated proﬁle (labelled “employed”).34 For both education
groups, participation rates are constant or display a slow decline until the age of 45, followed by a
sharp decline to age 62. Part of this fall reﬂects early retirement, rather than temporary periods
33The consumption equivalent is calculated as (1 − exp[η]).
34The proﬁles from the data are calculated controlling for cohort eﬀects and assuming that time eﬀects average out
to zero and are orthogonal to the time trend. The estimated participation rate is equal to the actual rate at age 40.
25out of the labor force. Since early retirement is an endogenous labor supply response, we treat this
in the same way as we treat unemployment. There is a level diﬀerence between the two groups: the
high educated participate more than the low educated up to age 45 (participation rates around 96%,
compared to 90% for the low educated), and the subsequent decline is less marked. Our match to
participation is fairly good for both skill groups.
We also plot the participation rate that would be obtained if all oﬀers received (including those
oﬀers from an existing employer) were accepted. This highlights the extent that the downturn in
participation with age is due to more oﬀers being rejected, rather than to fewer oﬀers being made.

















































Figure 3: Mean Duration over the Life-Cycle
High Education Low Education




















































Figure 3 compares mean unemployment durations over the life-cycle in the simulations and in
the data for both education groups. Durations have a maximum length determined by the number of
26quarters until age 62. In the data, durations are measured in months and are expressed as fractions
of a quarter. We are able to match very well the durations for the high education individuals. For
the low education ones we get a very similar proﬁle but shifted a bit to earlier ages.
In the model λ
n,λ
e,δ,F and η are independent of age and so the age eﬀects that we ﬁnd in
all the simulated proﬁles can be explained only by endogenous saving and labor supply behavior
in response to the budget constraint and the welfare beneﬁt structure: the match in the slope of
proﬁles over the life-cycle is not an artefact of age varying parameters and is a demonstration of the
strength of the model.
5.1 Implications of the model
We have calibrated the model using only participation and unemployment duration data, given the
pre-estimated wage process and given an intertemporal substitution parameter from the literature.
However, the model has implications for a range of diﬀerent variables. In particular, we use the
model to predict the wage loss associated with a spell of unemployment, the duration of employment
(“tenure”), the extent of consumption loss on unemployment, the arrival rate of accepted oﬀers, and
the ratio of mean wealth over stages of the life cycle to mean life-cycle income. Table 3 reports the
model predictions and corresponding statistics, obtained from various diﬀerent sources of data, for
an u m b e ro fs t a t i s t i c st h a ta r en o tu s e di nt h ec a l i b r a t i o n .
The Cost of Displacement There is empirical evidence that displaced workers experience earn-
ings losses following job loss. Some authors impute this to exogenous skill depreciation during periods
of unemployment (Rogerson and Schindler, 2001; Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2002). An alternative that
is consistent with our model is that wages on re-entry may be lower than before job loss because of
the loss of a particular good match on entering unemployment. We report in Table 3 the extent of
the wage fall on re-entry.
For the high educated, wages on re-entry are, on average, 19% lower than before displacement.
For the low educated, the loss is 14%. These ﬁgures are similar to those found in the literature. In
particular, we compare these ﬁgures with those reported by Jacubson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
for their non-mass layoﬀ sample (after controlling for time trends). They report that 1 quarter
after displacement, earnings of displaced workers are 19% less than before displacement. Finally,
27Table 3: Model Implications
Statistic Data Model
High Educ Low Educ High Educ Low Educ
Mean wage loss+
lnwτ − lnwt -0.19 -0.19 -0.14
lnwτ+4 − lnwt -0.076 -0.086 -0.058
Median duration of employment (Age 22-46)++ 12 21 15
Mean consumption loss (Age 25-60)∗
∆lnct+1/∆lnyt+1 0.56 0.42 0.57
Arrival rate of accepted job oﬀers (Age <40):
On-the-job 0.036 0.041
From unemployment 0.50 0.46
Fraction of job oﬀers accepted ( Age <40):
On-the-job 0.049 0.067
From unemployment 0.60 0.60
Mean wealth / mean lifetime income∗∗
Age 30-35 1.58 1.71 0.89 1.36
Age 50-55 7.27 5.13 5.66 5.34
+The data numbers for wage loss are taken from Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993). wt i st h ew a g ea td i s p l a c e -
ment, wτ i st h ew a g ea tr e e n t r y ,wτ+4 i st h ew a g eo n ey e a rl a t e r .
++ Employment durations are reported as number of quarters until employment with a particular employer ends.
∗The data numbers for consumption loss are taken from Browning and Crossley (2001).
∗∗The wealth data come from the 1994 PSID wealth supplement and include housing wealth and private pension
holdings. Mean lifetime income is deﬁned as average annual household income for heads of household aged 22-62.
28one implication of our model is that the displacement costs are likely to be relatively short lived.
Indeed, we calculate that 1 year after returning to work, wages of the low educated are only 5.8%
below their pre-displacement wages; for high educated individuals the ﬁgure is 8.6%. These ﬁgures
are very close to the ones we extrapolate from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) over a similar
time horizon.
Employment Durations The PSID has data on job tenure which could be used to pin down
the arrival rate of oﬀers while on the job, λ
e. Heads of household are asked how many years they
have been working with their current employer. There are three main diﬃculties with these data.
First, the spells are right-censored. Second, there is a substantial initial conditions problem with a
very large proportion of spells being left censored. Third, a number of authors have questioned the
reliability of these measures of reported tenure (Brown and Light, 1992). Because of these diﬃculties
we do not use these data in the calibration. Instead, we report statistics on employment duration
from the data and from the simulations in Table 3. We expect the simulated employment durations to
be longer than those obtained from the PSID. For the low educated, median employment duration
in the simulations is 15 quarters for those younger than 46. For the high educated the median
simulated spell length is 21 quarters. In the data, median employment duration is 12 quarters but
this is likely to be downward biased because of censoring.
Consumption Fall at Unemployment Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) have
explored empirically the consumption loss associated with unemployment. Consumption will be
lower in unemployment if the job loss followed a permanent loss in productivity, which implies a life
cycle wealth eﬀect and a lower incentive to work. In addition if there are non-separabilities between
consumption and leisure, as in our model, and leisure is a substitute for consumption, individuals will
cutback on consumption as leisure increases. Finally if individuals are unable to smooth consumption
through borrowing against future income they will also have to cut back more than they otherwise
would. Our model contains these three eﬀects, with the source of the income loss being the loss of
the match as well as possibly the wealth eﬀect implied by a negative permanent shock; the non-
separability being built into the structure of the utility function; the liquidity constraint being the
restriction that assets have to be non-negative.
29In Table 3 we report average consumption loss by education group and compare it to Browning
and Crossley (2001).35 They use data from a Canadian sample which includes many two earner
households; moreover the Canadian welfare system implies diﬀerent replacement rates. To control for
these diﬀerences we compare the percentage consumption lost relative to the percentage income lost
following unemployment. Our ﬁgures are remarkably close to the Browning and Crossley number,
whose comparable ﬁgure is 56%.36 We calculate a 57% relative loss for the low educated and a 42%
for the high educated. The Browning-Crossley sample contains 70% low educated individuals. So
on this score the model ﬁts the facts very well indeed.
Arrival rate of oﬀers on-the-job Table 3 reports the arrival rate of accepted job oﬀers among
workers and among the unemployed. For workers, the arrival rate of accepted oﬀers is low because
workers only choose to move if they receive a better oﬀer than the wage at their existing ﬁrm. Among
the unemployed a much higher proportion of oﬀers are accepted: the table shows that, among the
low educated, 60% of oﬀers are accepted by the unemployed, whereas only 7% of oﬀers are accepted
by the employed. The fast movement out of unemployment is not surprising because the oﬀer arrival
rate when employed is not much lower than it is for the unemployed making the option value of
unemployment low.
Wealth Accumulation The ﬁnal row in Table 3 reports, for individuals aged 30-35 and 50-55,
the ratio of average wealth holdings to average lifetime income. Our model captures fairly accurately
the level of wealth holdings of the low educated at both stages of life. For the high educated, the
model under-predicts slightly the wealth holdings, but the rate of wealth accumulation is similar.
6 Evidence on the Wage Process and Alternatives
Our choice of speciﬁcation for the stochastic process of wages is based on a long and well established
literature. However this does not make it uncontroversial. In this section, we address three issues
regarding the speciﬁcation: ﬁrst, we consider whether controlling for mobility aﬀects estimates of
the persistence of shocks; second, we consider modelling the match component as being stochastic;
35O u rn u m b e r sa r en o tc o m p a r a b l et ot h eG r u b e rc a l c u l a t i o nb e c a u s eh eo n l yu s e sf o o d .O n ew o u l dn e e dt oi n ﬂate
his number by dividing it by the marginal budget share for food to get back to a total consumption ﬁgure.
36Their ﬁgures are a 14% consumption loss and a 25% loss in income,which imply the number we report (56%).
30ﬁnally, we consider introducing heterogeneity in (deterministic) income growth rates, as in Guvenen
(2006).
Mobility and Persistence of Shocks One diﬃculty with relying on the existing literature to
support our speciﬁcation of a unit root in wages is that the papers that provide supporting evidence
do not control for worker mobility. In particular, job mobility decisions might create the impression
of greater persistence in income: for example, if mobility is ignored, wage increases due to moving
ﬁrm will be seen as permanent shocks, whereas when we control for mobility, shocks are identiﬁed
from within ﬁrm wage movements which may be less persistent. Our speciﬁcation imposes a unit root
on within ﬁrm wage movements, but the concern is that wages are not as persistent as they seemed
to be when mobility was ignored. To address this, we estimate the autocovariance properties of wage
growth residuals for workers who do not change job, controlling for selection. These autocovariances
still conform to the random walk process, rather than to one with less than unit root persistence.
In particular the autocovariances are statistically and economically insigniﬁcant after the ﬁrst two
lags and there is no evidence of a gradually declining pattern which would have been observed if a
simple AR(1) process had generated the data.37 Thus allowing for mobility cannot account for the
earlier ﬁnding of a random walk.
Stochastic Match Component The analysis in this paper has been based on the assumption
that the match speciﬁce ﬀect is constant for the duration of the match and that the shocks to
individual productivity persist beyond the current job. In fact, since these shocks are permanent,
they persist forever. If we had matched employer-employee data, we could have allowed for an even
richer speciﬁcation with a stochastic match component. Given our data restrictions, however, the
alternative assumption that we explore is that the match eﬀect is subject to permanent stochastic
shocks, while individual heterogeneity is captured by a ﬁxed eﬀect.
lnwit = dt + x0
itψ + fi + eit + aij(t0)t (11)
37We construct an estimate of wage growth residual in the PSID using the estimates from the SIPP discussed in
Section 4. We use the PSID because it allows us to look at longer autocovariances. In the PSID whether one is a
m o v e ro rs t a y e ri si d e n t i ﬁed correctly (up to measurement error). For stayers, the autocovariances at lags 0,1, 2, 3,
and 4 are, respectively 0.0854 (s.e. 0.0038), -0.0213 (0.0015), -0.0005 (0.0013), 0.0021 (0.0018), and -0.0029 (0.0030).
31where fi is an individual speciﬁc unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect, eit reﬂects measurement error and transitory
shocks and is taken to be an independently and identically distributed normal random variable, and
αij(t0)t is the value in period t of the match component for an individual who joined ﬁrm j in period




aij(t0)t = aij(t0)t−1 + ωij(t0)t
in the ﬁrst period working for ﬁrm j (t = t0)
in subsequent periods in ﬁrm j (12)
In equation (12), ωij(t0)t is an i.i.d. normal random variable. However, this is now a permanent
shock to the match speciﬁce ﬀect. This model has fundamentally diﬀerent implications from our
preferred speciﬁcation. For example, with this speciﬁcation, the shocks ωij(t0)t are in eﬀect transi-
tory: the individual can change jobs following a bad realizations of the match eﬀect, thus wiping the
slate clean from past shocks even if these are permanent at the match level. At the individual level,
there are no permanent shocks. We now show why our choice ﬁts the facts better. To achieve this we
estimate the alternative speciﬁcation and we calibrate a version of the model using the alternative
wage process, focusing on the low education group.
First, we show realized pay in the simulations of the preferred speciﬁcation and of the alternative
speciﬁcation. In the left-hand graph in Figure 4 we show how the simulated cross-sectional variance
of pay evolves for a cohort under our assumption of permanent shocks to productivity allowing for
all the endogenous decisions; this is the upward sloping line marked “Preferred”. The fall in the
cross-section variance that occurs at older ages and observed in the simulations arises because of the
sharp decline in participation among men over 50 and can also be seen in the data graph on the right
hand side panel. The ﬂat line, marked “Alternative” depicts the simulated cross-sectional variance
with the alternative model. The right-hand graph in Figure 4 shows the increase in the variance in
the data. The line labelled “estimated age eﬀect” reports the actual cross-sectional variance at each
age, while the line labelled “predicted age eﬀect” reports the predicted cross-sectional variance using
the speciﬁcation assumed in our preferred model.38 This predicted age eﬀect implicitly assumes that
there is full participation: the slope is the conditional variance of the permanent shock. This shows
that, for most of the life cycle, the cross-sectional variance of wages is increasing with age of the
cohort. Our preferred model describes the wage process far better than the alternative model.
38The “estimated age eﬀect" is obtained controlling for cohort eﬀects and assuming that time eﬀects average out
to zero and are orthogonal to a time trend.
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Figure 5: Standard Deviation of Initial Conditions
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The second piece of evidence in support of our preferred model comes from the estimates of
t h ev a r i a n c eo fi n i t i a lw a g e sr e q u i r e di nt h et w os p e c i ﬁcations. Figure 5 shows that the standard
deviation of the initial wage decreases with year of birth using the alternative speciﬁcation. This
contradicts evidence from MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) and others who show that more recent cohorts
face a higher variance on entering the labour market. However, with the alternative speciﬁcation,
the only way the model can ﬁt the increasing variance of wages by age that exists in the data is
to attribute the increase to cohort eﬀects, i.e. older cohorts have a higher variance on entering the
labour market. By contrast, using our preferred speciﬁcation, we estimate that the variance of initial
conditions is indeed higher for more recent cohorts.
The third bit of evidence we provide in support of our preferred model arises from calibrating
the model using the alternative speciﬁcation for wages, and then comparing in Table 4 the resulting
participation proﬁle to the data and to the proﬁle of our preferred speciﬁcation.
33The model with the alternative speciﬁcation is incapable of capturing the downturn in participa-
tion from about aged 45 onwards and the increased duration of unemployment spells for older people
that is present in the data. This contrasts with the success of our preferred speciﬁcation. The reason
for this is that in the alternative model anyone quitting due to a negative shock to the match speciﬁc
eﬀect can start again with a new job and “wash away” the past. By contrast, when these negative
shocks are individual speciﬁc and so persist across matches, an individual is more likely to remain
unemployed, particularly with the availability of means-tested beneﬁts and disability insurance.
Table 4: Observed and Matched Participation Rates, Low Education
Age Data Preferred Alternative
Model Model
22 − 31 0.90 0.91 0.90
32 − 41 0.89 0.89 0.88
42 − 51 0.83 0.84 0.88
52 − 61 0.63 0.66 0.89
A ﬁnal point is that our model also implies an increase in the cross sectional variance of con-
sumption, very much as in the data (see Deaton and Paxson, 1994). Without eﬀective persistence
in the shocks this cannot happen with the alternative model.
Thus overall, the alternative stochastic speciﬁcation with the random walk in the match com-
ponent is not consistent with the data and does not allow the model to match key moments of the
data anywhere near as well as we do with our preferred model. This is not to say that a richer
model that combined aspects of both stochastic speciﬁcations for wages could not do even better.
However, given the data limitations, we oﬀer a parsimonious model, that is capable of replicating
basic features of the data.
Heterogeneous Income Growth Model Guvenen (2008) argues that the increase in the cross-
sectional variance with age can also be achieved by allowing for heterogeneity in income growth rates
(as in Baker, 1997), alongside a lower degree of persistence of income shocks (an AR(1) parameter
of 0.82). This speciﬁcation will produce an increase in the cross-section variance of income with age,
as in the data and in our preferred speciﬁcation. If there were less persistence in income shocks but
without the income growth heterogeneity, then the variance would be concave in age and so both
34components are needed to match the data.
Distinguishing this speciﬁcation from one with a permanent shock is not straightforward: in the
data, the autocovariance of earnings growth is zero for observations more than two or three periods
apart which is consistent with the permanent shock model and not quite in line with the deterministic
individual speciﬁc growth, which would imply nonzero autocovariances at all lags. Guvenen points
out that with a high enough positive autoregressive coeﬃcient the eﬀects of the random growth on
the autocovariance structure can be obscured and its presence can only be identiﬁed by considering
the covariance of income growth many years apart when the persistent shock has little eﬀect (12 lags
or so, see Guvenen (2008)). However, long panel data sets have too much attrition over such long
time periods to provide a reliable test of this view. A further diﬃculty with this speciﬁcation, as
pointed out by Guvenen (2007), is that it would not match the growth in the variance of consumption
because of the limited innovations to income over the life-cycle. In order to match the growth in
the variance of consumption, it is necessary to assume that individuals do not know their own
growth term and have to learn about it over time. This gives rise to innovations over the life-
cycle, although it is diﬃcult to distinguish statistically between learning about a random growth
model and a model with a permanent shock.39 Further, Haider and Solon (2006) suggest that such
heterogeneity in trends may be most important early in the life-cycle, but that there is little evidence
for its importance beyond age 30. Guvenen and Smith (2008) use consumption and income data
to try to separate out the two models. Further, we do not preclude that introducing labour supply
choices into a Guvenen framework might generate interesting alternative implications. We have
chosen what is a parsimonious speciﬁcation that ﬁts the data well both in terms of income and in
terms of consumption behavior.
7 The Implications of Risk
Our model and characterization of shocks has important implications for the impact of risk on behav-
ior and welfare. Understanding these is relevant particularly when designing and evaluating policies
such as unemployment insurance, food stamps or other transfers (e.g. tax credits), which eﬀectively
39Farber and Gibbons (1996) assume that individual productivity is unknown to the ﬁrm, but it is learned over
time through observation of output, and so wages are updated in a Bayesian sense. They prove that this will result
in the wage residual being a martingale. Thus our unit root characterization can also be consistent with a less than
complete information case, but we have not considered the implications of the learning case as yet.
35insure part of the risk individuals face. In this model, we have exogenous, uninsured idiosyncratic
shocks and so welfare will increase if insurance is provided. We also have behavioral responses
to insurance built in both through changes in participation and through changes in savings. This
means we can quantify the risk sharing beneﬁts of diﬀerent sorts of insurance as well as identifying
the behavioral eﬀects induced by the insurance programs. In this section, we show ﬁrst the eﬀects
of varying productivity risk, looking at the eﬀects on participation, output and asset accumulation,
as well as welfare. We then show the eﬀects of varying the various aspects of employment risk,
including job destruction and ﬁr mh e t e r o g e n e i t y .T h e r ei sn oc o m m o nm e t r i cf o rt h ed i ﬀerent types
of risk and as such we cannot quantify their relative importance; we can however quantify their
eﬀects individually.
In the model the actions of individuals are linked to each other because we require the government

































it are 1/0 indicators of eligibility for each of the programs respectively and Pit =1denotes
employment. On the right hand side τwwithPit represents tax revenue from a working individual.
The deﬁcit term represents unaccounted expenditures or revenues and will be kept constant across all
simulation experiments. Following a simulated policy change we select the tax rate τw to satisfy this
government budget constraint; individuals take τw as given.40 Budget balance is imposed within a
particular education group. We therefore abstract from the insurance between groups that Attanasio
and Davis (1996) found to be important. Allowing the budget to balance over all education groups
would confound the issue we are considering with distributional questions.







where the subscript k refers to the implied consumption and labour supply stream in the baseline
40We assume that unemployment insurance and disability insurance are ﬁnanced by the tax on wages, even though
in reality the ﬁnancing is partly imposed upon the ﬁrms. However, if the incidence of the tax falls on the workers, as
most empirical studies ﬁnd, our assumption is inconsequential.
36economy (k =1 )or an alternative economy with diﬀerent risk characteristics (k =2 )and E0 is the
expectation at the beginning of working life. Now deﬁne π as the proportion of consumption an

















Since there are no aggregate shocks in the economy and no business cycle ﬂuctuations, we do not
consider the value of, for example, smoothing the eﬀect of the business cycle (as in Lucas, 1987) or
the value of removing variation in the extent of idiosyncratic risk over the life-cycle (as in Storesletten
et al., 2001). Such insurance removes heteroskedasticity but the average level of risk remains. Thus
we focus entirely on the cost to the individual of idiosyncratic risk, which would be insured in a ﬁrst
best setting.
7.1 Wage Risk
We start by considering the impact of the permanent shock to wages. We have already shown that
allowing for job mobility substantially reduces the amount of risk that we attribute to unexpected
changes in productivity. Indeed this reduction is likely to be very important.
In Figure 6 we report π, the willingness to pay to avoid changes in risk relative to the estimated
baseline. This willingness to pay arises because individuals are averse to the greater risk associated
with increases in σζ. Note that when we change the risk faced by the individual many aspects of
behavior will change, including labour supply as well as unemployment and employment durations.
These will result in output changes, which we also show on the graph, labelled as ∆lny.T h e
willingness to pay parameter has factored in all these aspects. While changes in wage risk end up
implying relatively low changes in output (particularly for the higher educated), they imply large
welfare losses. Thus a 50% increase of σζ to 0.159 for the high educated individuals, implies a 3.7%
loss in output but a willingness to pay to avoid this increase of 19.2% of consumption (the numbers
are in Table 5). It is not straightforward to compare across education groups because the baseline is
diﬀerent. However, we note that if we increase the variance for the low educated to the same level
(0.159) welfare goes down by less (16.4%). This is partly due to the eﬀect of the welfare programs,
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Figure 7: Eﬀect on Participation of Varying σς
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which are more important for this lower wage group. Output declines by more for the low educated,
as is visible from the graph, driven by the decrease in participation shown in Figure 7. However,
the overwhelming impression here is that wage risk is a major determinant of welfare, well beyond
its impact on output, making insurance for such risk potentially very valuable.
More detail on the eﬀects of varying wage risk is provided in Table 5: productivity shocks
have substantial eﬀects on unemployment durations, on consumption growth and on rates of asset
accumulation particularly among the young.41 In particular, for the high educated group, as σζ
increases by 50%, the median rate of wealth accumulation for individuals aged 25-35 almost doubles.
This faster accumulation results in an earlier and faster rate of decumulation when old, alongside
lower participation rates and longer unemployment durations.
41If, in addition to the participation decision, hours of work were ﬂexible, individuals would be able to self-insure
to a greater extent than in our model.
38Table 5: Comparative Statics: Varying σζ
σζ π ∆lny Mean Mean Median (∆A/y) Age
Duration ∆lnct at max
47-52 25-44 45-62 25-35 36-50 51-62
High Education
0.053 0.128 0.020 2.0 0.033 0.005 0.026 0.16 0.18 62
0.095 0.032 0.006 4.6 0.029 0.012 0.11 0.24 0.10 62
0.106 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.076 62
0.159 -0.192 -0.037 12.5 0.030 0.015 0.27 0.24 -0.068 58
Low Education
0.053 0.087 0.047 2.8 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.19 0.085 62
0.095 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.017 0.010 0.10 0.17 -0.010 57
0.106 -0.026 -0.011 9.1 0.017 0.011 0.14 0.17 -0.036 57
0.159 -0.164 -0.055 13.9 0.019 0.014 0.24 0.16 -0.16 55
Note: For the columns concerning the amount of assets, the denominator is average realized earnings (net of the ﬁxed
cost of work) in the education-speciﬁc baseline. Duration is measured in quarters.
7.2 Employment Risk
The two important parameters associated directly with employment risk are job destruction and
the variance of the match speciﬁce ﬀect. We now consider the implications of varying each of these
parameters.
Job Destruction Figure 8 shows the impact on welfare and output of varying job destruction,
δ. Increases in job destruction have large eﬀects on output partly through increasing unemployment
and partly through limiting the time that individuals are matched with the best ﬁrms. Individuals are
willing to pay to avoid the increase in job destruction. There are three aspects to this willingness
to pay: there is a loss of income reﬂected in the overall loss in output; there is an increase in
employment risk; and there is an oﬀsetting increase in leisure time. For both education groups, the
eﬀect of the increased riskiness, which otherwise would have raised the welfare loss above the loss
of output, is oﬀset by the value of increased leisure resulting from the fall in employment shown in
Figure 9. More details of the eﬀects of varying δ on behavior is provided in Table 12 in the appendix.
Durations of unemployment are shorter when δ is higher because of a composition eﬀect: more of the
unemployed are out of work because of job destruction rather than because of low productivity, and
so are more likely to receive job oﬀers above their reservation wage. The rate of wealth accumulation
39Figure 8: Welfare Costs and Output Eﬀects of Varying Job Destruction


















Figure 9: Eﬀect on Participation of Varying Job Destruction








































01 . 0 = δ
03 . 0 = δ
049 . 0 = δ
07 . 0 = δ
01 . 0 = δ
03 . 0 = δ
049 0. = δ
07 . 0 = δ
decreases with a higher value of δ because the increase in time unemployed reduces opportunities
for accumulation.
Firm Heterogeneity Figure 10 shows the impact on welfare and output of varying ﬁrm het-
erogeneity, σa. Increasing ﬁrm heterogeneity implies a greater variety of ﬁrms in terms of their
productivity. However, because of on-the-job search the best ﬁrms tend to be over-represented in
t e r m so fa c c e p t e do ﬀers, which pushes output up, as clearly seen in the ﬁgure. This eﬀect of selec-
tion into the best ﬁrms leads to greater participation among older individuals when heterogeneity
is increased, as shown in Figure 11. Increased heterogeneity therefore pushes welfare up, but not as
much as output: increasing heterogeneity implies an increase in the cost of job loss because workers
are in danger of loosing a more coveted job. Interestingly the eﬀect is not symmetric around our
baseline estimates: decreasing ﬁrm heterogeneity decreases welfare as much as it does output.
More details of the eﬀects of varying σa on behavior are provided in Table 13 in appendix C.
For those age 25-35, greater ﬁrm heterogeneity leads to faster wealth accumulation for the high
education group, but to slower wealth accumulation for the low education group. This reﬂects the
40Figure 10: Welfare Costs and Output Eﬀects of Varying Firm Heterogeneity
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Figure 11: Eﬀect on Participation of Varying Firm Heterogeneity
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41oﬀsetting incentives caused on the one hand by greater risk inducing faster accumulation, while on
the other hand, the greater expected future income induces slower accumulation.
Oﬀer Arrival Rates The impact of varying the arrival rate of job oﬀers when unemployed
is shown in Table 14, and better described through text. Varying the quarterly arrival rate, λ
n,
between 0.66 and 0.96 increases output for the low educated by 2%, and for the high educated who
experience less unemployment by 1%. Further, average unemployment durations decrease by about
1m o n t h .T h e s ee ﬀects translate into welfare gains of 1.6% and 1.2% respectively. Compared to the
output change, this suggests the high educated value the increased arrival rate more highly. This is
because the opportunity cost of being unemployed is greater for the high educated: the high educated
receive higher wage oﬀers and are not as well insured as the low educated by the unemployment
insurance and food stamps programs. For both groups, rates of wealth accumulation are hardly
aﬀected by the changing arrival rate.
7.3 Implications of Government Insurance
Our framework is well suited for evaluating the welfare eﬀects of the various programs. Such an
evaluation requires a life-cycle model where risk plays an important role, and where labour supply
is endogenous in order to capture the key source of moral hazard and a further mechanism of self-
insurance over and above savings. The Food Stamps program tends to provide partial insurance
for income loss whatever the source of the loss, while UI oﬀers compensation when income loss is
associated with job destruction. As such each program can be thought of as targeting diﬀerent risks
and it is important to quantify how these are valued, although they are unlikely to provide anything
close to full insurance. We now turn to a brief examination of the welfare eﬀects of these two social
insurance programs.42
We consider a small (1%) increase in the government spending on social insurance and compare
the welfare eﬀects of channelling this change, in turn, into UI and into the Food Stamps-type
program. This calculation focuses on the insurance beneﬁt of these programs because there is no
cross-group redistribution. The results are presented in rows 1 and 2 of Table 6. Row 3 considers the
42There are two caveats to these comments: ﬁrst, these calculations ignore the interactions that may arise between
increases in the tax rate needed to fund increased generosity of a program and the take-up of that program: the
increased tax rate will make programs more valuable by reducing the beneﬁt of being at work. Second, in practice
these programs are funded by taxing the general population and consequently involve a large component of cross
group insurance.
42Table 6: Welfare eﬀects of government programmes
High Education Low Education
Scenario Willingness to pay % Willingness to pay %
(π × 100)( π × 100)
Unemp. Insurance 0.19 0.24
Food stamps 0.25 0.30
Tax Change 0.08 0.15
welfare beneﬁt of using the extra spending to reduce the proportional tax rate. For both education
groups the most valuable program is the means-tested program because it provides some insurance
against large negative (and permanent) shocks. In considering the tax cut, the two groups are willing
to pay 0.08% and 0.15% of consumption, respectively, to see the 1% increase in expenditure going
to a tax cut. This implies both groups prefer the money to be spent on UI or the means-tested
program, rather than on a decrease in taxation within their own group.43
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have speciﬁed a life-cycle model of consumption, labour supply and job mobility
when match eﬀects are important determinants of wages. Standard lifecycle models have one source
of risk, which is captured by ﬂuctuations in incomes, and is assumed to be exogenous. However,
this confounds earnings ﬂuctuations due to exogenous reasons with those resulting from responses to
shocks, such as changes in employment or job mobility. In our model we have introduced explicitly
the key underlying sources of risk, and further by endogenizing employment and job mobility we are
able to provide a framework where the eﬀects of these diﬀerent sources of risk can be investigated.
In our model the underlying sources of risk are from shocks to individual wages, shocks to the ﬁrm
that lead to job destruction, the process of job oﬀers when the individual is employed and when he
i so u to fw o r k ,a n dt h ev a l u eo ft h em a t c hs p e c i ﬁce ﬀe c tt h a ti sa s s o c i a t e dw i t haj o bo ﬀer. Finally,
an important aspect of our model is that we allow for the presence of social insurance programs,
mirroring the Food Stamps program, the Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance and social
43We do not present numbers for increasing the spending on the disability insurance programme. In our model,
spending on the Disability Insurance and Social Security program is valued less than the tax cut. However, our model
of DI in eﬀect abstracts from the impact of large or catastrophic health shocks against which insurance is likely to be
very valuable and which is provided mainly by DI in reality.
43security for the elderly. This means that we can measure the eﬀects of shocks allowing for the
institutional environment that oﬀers some partial insurance.
First we estimate the wage process using data from the SIPP, allowing for job to job mobility
and controlling for the endogeneity of participation and job changes. We show that representing
the stochastic process of wage rates as a permanent shock (unit root) and a transitory component
(measurement error), alongside a match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, we can ﬁt the wage data very well. We
show that ignoring job mobility overstates productivity risk, as measured by the standard deviation
of a permanent shock, by 50%: much of the earnings ﬂuctuations often attributed to income risk is
due to individuals accepting better wage oﬀers. Some of these wage ﬂuctuations do not reﬂect risk;
they are the response to obtaining a better oﬀer in a world with heterogeneous matches. However,
match heterogeneity implies new sources of risk: individuals may loose a valuable match when the
job is destroyed, and they are uncertain about the value of the oﬀer they will receive.
The remaining parameters are obtained by calibrating the model to ﬁt the observed life-cycle
participation proﬁles and unemployment durations. We show that an alternative speciﬁcation of
the wage process, where there are no permanent productivity shocks to the individual, but only
shocks to the match speciﬁce ﬀect, cannot reproduce the participation proﬁles. Our conclusion is
that permanent shocks are an important ingredient for ﬁtting the observed data on life-cycle work
patterns. After showing that our speciﬁcation does ﬁt a number of key facts we use it to carry
out comparative static analysis with respect to changes in the diﬀerent types of risk. We show that
increases in productivity risk decrease output and welfare: indeed individuals are willing to pay more
than the lost output to return to the pre-increase state of aﬀairs. Increases in job destruction also
cause declines in welfare and output. However, individuals are willing to pay less than the decline
in output to avoid the increase in this risk. On the other hand, small increases in the variance
of match heterogeneity, although leading to increased risk, increases welfare (as well as output)
because it oﬀers enhanced opportunities for wage growth through job mobility. This makes it all the
more important not to attribute wage ﬂuctuations due to job mobility to productivity risk. In our
comparative static exercises we also consider the eﬀect of risk changes on participation and savings.
In the ﬁnal section we quantify the value of two of the social insurance programs: Food Stamps
and Unemployment insurance. Both the low and the high educated prefer an increase in the gen-
44erosity of either of these programs to a decrease in proportional taxation costing the same amount.
Both education groups prefer the extra expenditure spent on Food Stamps rather than UI. This is
because Food Stamps is a broader insurance program, oﬀering some protection against declines in
productivity, while UI is just insuring a transitory loss of work.
45A Appendix: Numerical Solution
Households have a ﬁnite horizon and so the model is solved numerically by backward recursion from
the terminal period. At each age we solve the value function and optimal policy rule, given the
current state variables and the solution to the value function in the next period. This approach
is standard. The complication in our model arises from the combination of a discrete choice (to
participate or not) and a continuous choice (over saving). This combination means that the value
function will not necessarily be concave. The discrete choice about whether to move or not is less
problematic because we assume that there is no cost of moving. This means that the decision to
move depends only on the relative size of the match eﬀect in the current and new ﬁrm.
There are ﬁve state variables in this problem: age, employment status, the asset stock, the per-
manent component of earnings, uit, and the match component, aij(t0). Age and employment status
are both discrete. We also discretize both the permanent component of earnings and the distrib-
ution of possible matches, leaving the asset stock as the only continuous state variable. Since the
permanent component of earnings is non-stationary, we are able to approximate this by a stationary,
discrete process only because of the ﬁnite horizon of the process. We select the discrete nodes in this
process to match the paths of the mean shock and the unconditional variance over the life-cycle. In
particular, the unconditional variance of the permanent component must increase linearly with age,
with the slope given by the conditional variance of the permanent shock. Our estimates of the wage
variance are for annual shocks, but the model period is one quarter. We reconcile this diﬀerence by
imposing that each quarter an individual receives a productivity shock with probability 0.25, and
this implies that productivity shocks occur on average once a year. This timing means individuals
who stay with the same ﬁrm expect pay to be constant over a year.
Value functions are increasing in assets At but they are not necessarily concave, even if we condi-
tion on labor market status in t. The non-concavity arises because of changes in labor market status
in future periods: the slope of the value function is given by the marginal utility of consumption,
but this is not monotonic in the asset stock because consumption can decline as assets increase and
expected labor market status in future periods changes. This problem is also discussed in Lentz
and Tranaes (2001). By contrast, in Danforth (1979) employment is an absorbing state and so the
conditional value function will be concave. Under certainty, the number of kinks in the conditional
46value function is given by the number of periods of life remaining. If there is enough uncertainty,
then changes in work status in the future will be smoothed out leaving the expected value function
concave: whether or not an individual will work in t +1at a given At depends on the realization
of shocks in t +1 . Using uncertainty to avoid non-concavities is analogous to the use of lotteries
elsewhere in the literature. In the value functions (7) and (8), the choice of participation status in
t +1is determined by the maximum of the conditional value functions in t +1 .
In solving the maximization problem at a given point in the state space, we use a simple golden
search method. We solve the model and do the calibration assuming this process is appropriate.
We then check that the results in our baseline case are unaﬀected when we use a global optimizing
routine, simulated annealing. It is worth stressing that there are parameter values for which the
techniques we used do not work. In particular, as the variance of shocks gets suﬃciently low, the
non-concavities in the expected value functions become problematic.
B Appendix: Deriving Moments for the Variance of Wages
B.1 The Preferred model
In our preferred model, wages are given by
lnwit = dt + x0
itψ + uit + eit + aij(t0)
where uit = uit−1 + ζit is the permanent component, eit the measurement error, and aij(t0) is the
match eﬀect. Thus wage growth is
∆lnwit = ∆dt + ∆x0





denotes the change in the match eﬀect for those who switched employ-







47for all t.D e ﬁne participants in period t by (Pit =1 )≡ (P∗
it > 0) and similarly those who have
changed workplace since the previous year by (Mit =1 )≡ (M∗
it > 0).
Wage growth is measured annually. However, all decisions by the individual are made quarterly
in the model. To make these two consistent we assume that the individual receives a wage shock each
quarter with 0.25 probability. Then when we observe a wage over a year we assume it is the result of
aggregating wages over the quarters that the individual worked in this ﬁrm. Thus the participation
Mills ratio we use is the average Mills ratio over the number of quarters the individual worked with
the ﬁrm he is currently observed. This eﬀectively assumes that the participation and wage shocks
are both independent over time.44 Denoting the number of quarters the individual worked by Q










 (with φ and Φ being the
standard normal density and probability functions respectively), for annual wages the Mills ratio































is not exact aggregation, but an approximation because the dependent variable is the log of the
average wage and the right hand side is a model for the average log wage (both within the year).
However, the approximation error is likely to be negligible for two reasons: ﬁrst, it is proportional
to the diﬀerence between the arithmetic and geometric mean of wages within a year that depends
on the within year/within ﬁrm variance of wages, which is small. Second, any systematic error in
the levels is removed by taking the growth of wages and the remaining part will be absorbed by the
measurement error, leaving the estimate of the variance of the permanent eﬀect σζ unaﬀected.
In all calculations the mobility equation is kept constant across quarters and measures the prob-
ability that an individual changes jobs between any two years, which is what we need to correct for
mobility selection.
Conditioning on participation in periods t and t − 1, we obtain:
44We make this assumption for tractability: otherwise we would have to jointly condition on an eight dimensional
selection vector, ie. the sequence of participation decisions in each quarter over two years. As we do it we still
condition on each of the participation outcomes but not on the joint event.
48E (∆lnwit|Pit = Pit−1 =1 ) = E (∆lnwit|Mit =0 ,P it = Pit−1 =1 )( 1− Pr(Mit =1 ) )
+E (∆lnwit|Mit =1 ,P it = Pit−1 =1 )P r( Mit =1 )













The ρls are correlation coeﬃcients between stochastic terms l and s. Thus, Git is a “selection
term” accounting for conditioning on multiple indices. The estimation of the equation above is
standard (Heckman 2-step method).
The variances of the wage shocks are identiﬁed by the restrictions imposed on the moments of
residual wage growth git ≡ ζit +∆uit +ξitMit. Using formulae from Tallis (1961), the ﬁrst moment
for job stayers and movers respectively is:
































itθ). The parameters of the model are clearly not identiﬁed



























































































Finally, we consider the ﬁrst order autocovariance E (gitgit−1 |.). At least in principle, we could
use information on those who work for three periods in a row and classify them on the basis of their
49mobility decisions. In practice, there are too few observations in the relevant categories to be able to
get structural identiﬁcation in this case. We thus assume Pr(Mt =1 ,M t−1 =1 )≈ 0 and consider
only the restrictions on the unconditional autocovariance, namely
E (gitgit−1)=−σ2
e
The only set of parameters that are left to identify are the cohort-speciﬁcv a r i a n c e so ft h ei n i t i a l
draw of the permanent component ui0. In general, at time t:
lnwit = dt + x0




Conditioning on participation in that period:
E (lnwit|Pit =1 )=dt + x0
itψ +
¡





where σu(b) varies with cohort. We thus regress lnwit onto dt,x 0
it,λ
P
it, the interaction of λ
P
it with
year of birth dummies, and the interaction of λ
P
it with experience, using only data on labor market
participants. Next, we deﬁne the residual in levels as
eit =( l nwit − dt − x0




The parameter σu(b) can be identiﬁed using the following restrictions:
E (uit|Pit =1 ) =
³√







































These moments depend partly on some of the parameters characterizing unexplained wage growth
(such as σε, σζ, etc.). Since estimating all the moments jointly is complicated, we adopt a two-step
procedure. We ﬁrst estimate σε, σζ, σα, ρζπ, ρξπ using the restrictions on unexplained wage growth
(14)-(17). We then use (18) and (19) (conditioning on the estimated values of σε, σζ, σα, ρζπ, ρξπ)
to estimate σu(b) separately for each cohort. Due to convergence problems, we ﬁx ρuπ t oac o m m o n
value. The estimates of σu(b) for the low education group are plotted against year of birth in Figure
5.
50B.2 The Alternative model
Consider a model in which the matching eﬀect follows a random walk over the life of a job:
αij(t0)t = αij(t0)t−1 + ωij(t0)t
= αij(t0) | {z }






cumulative shocks to the initial match component
The notation is as follows: j (t0) indexes a job that started in period t0.I n t h e ﬁrst year in a
new job (say t0), the match component is αij(t0). In the second year, it’s αij(t0) + ωij(t0)t0+1,a n d
so forth.
Assume wages are now given by:
lnwit = dt + x0
itψ + fi + eit + αij(t0)t
where fi is an individual time-invariant random eﬀect. Deﬁne the growth residual as:


























is the innovation in the “initial" match component.
Assume as before that an individual moves (Mit =1 )i fµit > −k0
itθ and works at time t if
πit > −z0









for s 6= t
for s = t
and ε is a pure measurement error term (no selection issues). The ﬁr s tm o m e n to fgit conditional
on moving is:







−(t − t0 − 1)σωρωµλ
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it (20)




= σωµ for s ≤ t.T h eﬁr s tm o m e n to fgit
conditional on staying is














































































f(b) (the variance of the individual random eﬀect) remains not identiﬁed from
growth terms alone. Identiﬁcation must come from using levels. However, xit will almost surely
contain tenure, and we lack a good instrument for it. To avoid this problem, we consider wages in
the ﬁrst year with the ﬁrm (when tenure is 0):
lnwit0 = x0
it0β + fi + αij(t0) + εit0
Assuming tenure is the only potentially endogenous variable among the xit, we can run a OLS
regression (controlling for selection into work), and obtain an estimate of the residual in levels:








Hence, we regress lnwit0 onto x0
it0,λ
P
it0, and the interaction of λ
P
it with year of birth dummies,




lnwit0 − dt0 − x0
it0ψ
¢
= fi + αij(t0) + εit0
>From here, σ2
f can be identiﬁed from using the two restrictions:
































As before, these moments depend partly on some of the parameters characterizing unexplained
wage growth. Also in this case, we follow a two-step strategy. We ﬁrst estimate σε, σω, σα, ρξπ
using the restrictions on unexplained wage growth (20)-(24). We then use (25) and (26) to estimate
σf(b) separately for each cohort. The estimates of σf(b) for the low education group are plotted
against year of birth in Figure 5.
B.2.1 Estimates of Wage Variances in the Alternative Model
The expressions above make clear that one needs data on tenure (t−t0) to identify the parameters
of interest in the alternative model. The ﬁrst SIPP interview contains a special module collecting
labor market data, including information on tenure with the current employer. We then update
tenure over subsequent interviews using information on ﬁrm mobility.
Using a similar estimation procedure with all the suitable corrections for selection for job mobility
and employment, we produce estimates for the key parameters, shown in Table 7. Thus σω is
the standard deviation of the permanent shock to the match speciﬁce ﬀect (ωij(t0)t), σe is the
standard deviation of the transitory shock/measurement error (eit), σa is the standard deviation of
t h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo ft h et h em a t c hs p e c i ﬁce ﬀect (aij(t0))a n dσf is the standard deviation of individual
heterogeneity (fi). The estimated standard deviation of the innovation is now a bit lower. However,
we now need a much higher level of heterogeneity upfront than we do in our model so as to match
53Table 7: Standard deviations for the alternative model





Note: σf is the mean over all cohorts. Standard errors are not corrected.
the cross sectional variance of wages. As we shall see this implies a much higher variance of wages
for the young and a far too low variance for older individuals.
In estimating the stochastic process for wages, we also allow for a transitory component. This
can be given many diﬀerent interpretations and these include measurement error and transitory
shocks to the match speciﬁce ﬀect of wages. Thus, in our preferred speciﬁcation, we do not ignore
shocks to the match speciﬁce ﬀect; however, we assume that the shocks do not aﬀect behavior. This
is done in part because transitory shocks are likely to be easier to insure and partly because it is
hard to decompose the transitory element into that reﬂecting measurement error and that reﬂecting
substantive shocks to productivity of the match.45
45Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) show how to bound the variance of transitory shocks.
54C Appendix: Tables on Participation, Mobility, Calibration




Typical weekly hours 38.14 16.92




Unearned income (net of transfers) 1026.74 2175.21
High education 0.55 0.50
Public sector 0.07 0.26
Northeast 0.21 0.41
North Central 0.28 0.45
South 0.26 0.44
Note: The table report quarterly averages. Earnings and unearned income are converted
in real terms using the CPI (CPI=1 in 1992:10).
55Table 9: The Participation Equations for each Quarter
High school or less College dropout or more

































































































































Note: The table reports marginal eﬀects. Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis. For region and year dummies
we report the value of the χ2 statistics of joint signiﬁcance and, in parenthesis, the degrees of freedom and the p-value
of the test.
Table 10: The Mobility Equation






















(4 df; p-value χ2 0%)
60.68
(4 df; p-value χ2 0%)
Region dummies 6.73
(3 df; p-value χ2 8%)
2.77
(3 df; p-value χ2 43%)
Year dummies 35.36
(2 df; p-value χ2 0%)
71.07









Note: The table reports marginal eﬀects. Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis. For region and year dummies
we report the value of the χ2 statistics of joint signiﬁcance and, in parenthesis, the degrees of freedom and the p-value
of the test.
56Table 11: Observed and Matched Moments
Statistic Age High Education Low Education
Data Model Data Model
22 − 31 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.91
32 − 41 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.89
Participation Rate 42 − 51 0.91 0.92 0.83 0.84
52 − 61 0.78 0.79 0.63 0.66
22 − 26 1.59 1.70 1.90 1.92
27 − 31 1.92 2.16 2.29 2.34
32 − 36 2.03 2.31 3.07 2.59
Mean Duration 37 − 41 2.37 2.39 2.44 2.84
42 − 46 2.93 2.83 3.36 3.44
47 − 51 5.28 5.71 4.07 7.75
52 − 56 7.09 6.24 7.83 6.90
57 − 61 4.82 3.91 5.01 3.93
Table 12: Comparative Statics: Varying the job destruction rate δ
δπ Output Mean Mean Median (∆A/y) Age
Duration ∆lnct at max
47-52 25-44 45-62 25-35 36-50 51-62
High Education
0.01 0.062 0.122 8.5 0.030 0.014 0.14 0.24 0.09 62
0.03 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.076 62
0.049 -0.046 -0.082 4.9 0.028 0.012 0.10 0.24 0.066 62
0.07 -0.085 -0.145 4.4 0.027 0.012 0.071 0.24 0.058 62
Low Education
0.01 0.101 0.252 13.1 0.019 0.011 0.18 0.21 0.037 59
0.03 0.043 0.099 9.1 0.018 0.011 0.18 0.20 0.012 58
0.049 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.017 0.010 0.10 0.17 -0.010 57
0.07 -0.039 -0.085 7.0 0.016 0.010 0.08 0.15 -0.025 57
Note: For the columns concerning the amount of assets, the denominator is average realized earnings (net of the ﬁxed
cost of work) in the education-speciﬁc baseline. Duration is measured in quarters.
57Table 13: Comparative Statics: Varying the standard deviation of the match speciﬁce ﬀect σα
σα π Output Mean Mean Median (∆A/y) Age
Duration ∆lnct at max
47-52 25-44 45-62 25-35 36-50 51-62
High Education
0.11 -0.187 -0.185 7.6 0.025 0.013 0.10 0.22 0.065 61
0.22 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.076 62
0.33 0.131 0.181 5.4 0.032 0.012 0.19 0.26 0.086 62
Low Education
0.11 -0.150 -0.171 9.9 0.014 0.010 0.12 0.16 -0.019 56
0.22 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.017 0.010 0.10 0.17 -0.010 57
0.33 0.124 0.184 6.8 0.020 0.010 0.067 0.20 -0.006 58
Note: For the columns concerning the amount of assets, the denominator is average realized earnings (net of the ﬁxed
cost of work) in the education-speciﬁc baseline. Duration is measured in quarters.
Table 14: Comparative Statics: Varying the job arrival rate for the Unemployed λ
n
λ
n π Output Mean Mean Median (∆A/y) Age
Duration ∆lnct at max
47-52 25-44 45-62 25-35 36-50 51-62
High Education
0.96 0.004 0.003 5.8 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.078 62
0.84 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.076 62
0.76 -0.003 -0.002 5.8 0.029 0.013 0.14 0.25 0.075 62
0.66 -0.008 -0.007 6.1 0.029 0.013 0.15 0.25 0.074 62
Low Education
0.96 0.010 0.012 7.5 0.017 0.010 0.11 0.17 -0.001 58
0.84 0.004 0.005 7.7 0.017 0.010 0.11 0.17 -0.005 58
0.76 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.017 0.010 0.10 0.17 -0.010 57
0.66 -0.006 -0.007 8.0 0.017 0.010 0.10 0.17 -0.016 57
Note: For the columns concerning the amount of assets, the denominator is average realized earnings (net of the ﬁxed
cost of work) in the education-speciﬁc baseline. Duration is measured in quarters.
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